Brain circuits involved in understanding our own and other’s internal states in the context of romantic relationships by Esménio, Sofia et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=psns20
Social Neuroscience
ISSN: 1747-0919 (Print) 1747-0927 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/psns20
Brain circuits involved in understanding our
own and other’s internal states in the context of
romantic relationships
Sofia Esménio, José Miguel Soares, P. Oliveira-Silva, Óscar F. Gonçalves, Jean
Decety & Joana Coutinho
To cite this article: Sofia Esménio, José Miguel Soares, P. Oliveira-Silva, Óscar F. Gonçalves,
Jean Decety & Joana Coutinho (2019) Brain circuits involved in understanding our own and other’s
internal states in the context of romantic relationships, Social Neuroscience, 14:6, 729-738, DOI:
10.1080/17470919.2019.1586758
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2019.1586758
Accepted author version posted online: 26
Feb 2019.
Published online: 08 Mar 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 218
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Brain circuits involved in understanding our own and other’s internal states in
the context of romantic relationships
Sofia Esménio a, José Miguel Soaresb,c, P. Oliveira-Silvad, Óscar F. Gonçalvesa,e, Jean Decetyf
and Joana Coutinhoa
aPsychological Neuroscience Laboratory, Psychology School, Minho University, Braga, Portugal; bLife and Health Sciences Research Institute
(ICVS), School of Health Sciences, University of Minho, Braga, Portugal; cICVS/3B’s – PT Government Associate Laboratory, Braga/Guimarães,
Portugal, Clinical Academic Center, Braga, Portugal; dFaculty of Education and Psychology, Catholic University of Portugal, Porto, Portugal;
eSpaulding Center for Neuromodulation, Spaulding Rehabilitation Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA; fDepartment of
Psychology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
ABSTRACT
Social interactions require the capacity to understand both our and other’s internal states. These
semi-independent skills, the ability to understand oneself and others, seem to rely on the same type
of representations and recruit similar brain areas. In this study, we looked at the neural basis of self
and other processing in the context of an interaction with a significant other. Fourty-two participants
in a monogamous relationship completed an fMRI task in which they watched a set of video-
vignettes of his/her romantic partner expressing emotional contents. Participants were asked to
elaborate on his/her spouse´s experience (other condition) and on his/her own experience when
watching the video-vignettes (self-condition). The results showed a significant overlap in the brain
activation for both conditions (e.g. anterior insula, posterior cingulate/precuneus, inferior frontal
gyrus, inferior parietal lobule). In addition, the self-condition recruited brain areas associated with
interoceptive processing and affect sharing (e.g., posterior insula), whereas the other-condition
engaged brain areas involved in the cognitive representation of another’s internal states and self-
other distinction (e.g., fusiform, supramarginal gyrus, angular gyrus and temporoparietal junction).
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 18 September 2018
Revised 23 January 2019
Published online 07 March
2019
KEYWORDS
Social cognition; theory of
mind; self/other processing;
romantic relationships
Introduction
The ability to make sense of what we ourselves and others
feel or think is at the center of our capacity to interact with
others. There is a general consensus, among social neu-
roscience researchers, that this capacity to understand
internal states, either ours or those of others, recruits two
main pathways: a socio- affective route (de Vignemont &
Singer, 2006), and a socio-cognitive route (Frith & Frith,
2005). The socio-affective pathway corresponds to embo-
died, visceral or bottom up dimensions of social processing
(Decety & Lamm, 2006; Singer & Lamm, 2009), while the
socio-cognitive pathway refers to conceptual or top down
processes that involves higher cognitive functions
(Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2005).
Research shows that these two pathways engage inde-
pendent brain networks (Kanske, Böckler, Trautwein, &
Singer, 2015). The socio-affective route recruits areas such
as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior midcingu-
late cortex (aMCC) extending into the supplementary
motor area (SMA), anterior insula (AI), inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG), posterior cingulate (PCC), anterior thalamus,
the middle temporal gyrus (MTG),midbrain and inferior
parietal lobe (IPL) -including the supramarginal gyrus
(SMG) and angular gyrus. (Bzdok et al., 2012; Fan, Duncan,
de Greck, & Northoff, 2011). On the other hand, the socio-
cognitive pathway which are often termed as Theory of
Mind (TOM), or mentalizing recruits a network of brain
regions that includes the posterior/ventral temporoparietal
junction (TPJ), precuneus, MTG, superior temporal sulcus
(STS), temporal poles and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
(Bzdok et al., 2012; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, &
Perner, 2014).
Although both socio-affective and socio-cognitive
pathways have been extensively investigated, research
has only recently start looking at how these two pathways
interact when processing our own and other´s internal
states in situations in real social life (Lamm, Decety, &
Singer, 2010; Zaki, Weber, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2009). In
fact, the majority of the experimental studies in social
cognition use paradigms with fictional targets (e.g.,
Singer et al., 2006) or relatively artificial situations, with
very few studies looking at the brain´s response in real
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interpersonal interactions. This is important because in
naturally occurring social encounters there are several
factors that influence the neural response to other´s emo-
tions such as the affective proximity with the target,
familiarity (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg,
1997), and how much protection or care (Batson,
Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005) the target needs. Another
aspect that characterizes our most significant interperso-
nal interactions such as parent-child or couples’ interac-
tion, is that we often have to empathize with emotional
contents that are directed towards us and thus often have
to alternate between the focus on our internal states and
those of the other
Research in social neuroscience suggests that the
understanding of other’s feelings and mental states
rely on the same type of representations necessary to
understand our own internal states (Lamm, Bukowski, &
Silani, 2016). Accordingly, previous studies have found
that similar brain areas are recruited when processing
self or other internal states in both affective (e.g. empa-
thy for pain) (Lamm et al., 2010; Singer et al., 2004), as
well as cognitive experimental paradigms (e.g. reason-
ing about oneself/mentalizing) (Lombardo et al., 2010;
Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). In agreement with
these findings, Dimaggio, Lysaker, Carcione, Nicolò,
and Semerari (2008) suggested that the ability to
understand oneself and others are “semi-independent
skills”. Indeed, recent evidence has also found that
enhancing the ability to understand our own states
increases the ability to understand those of another
(Böckler, Herrmann, Trautwein, Holmes, & Singer,
2017). This may be particularly relevant for the context
of romantic relationships, if we consider evidence from
simulation theories of social cognition suggesting that
the closer the other is to oneself, the more likely we are
to base inferences about them on the knowledge about
oneself (Adolphs, 2002; Gallese & Goldman, 1998).
However, as mentioned before, so far, the attempts
to investigate the interdependence of self and other
processing in the context of a meaningful relationship
with a significant other, in particular in romantic rela-
tionships, are still scarce. Hence, the present study
investigates the brain mechanisms involved in our abil-
ity to understand oneself and a romantic partner.
Indeed, romantic relationships are the central rela-
tionship for most adults, having an important duration
in human´s life cycle (Robles & Kiecolt-Glaser, 2003).
They constitute a rich source of emotional interchange
(Gottman & Levenson, 1988), highly dependent on feel-
ings of understanding, support and empathic validation
(Péloquin & Lafontaine, 2010; Waldinger, Hauser, Schulz,
Allen, & Crowell, 2004). In addition, our choice for focus-
ing on romantic relationships was justified by the well-
documented negative impact of marital conflict on the
physical and mental health of each partner (e.g., Beach,
Fincham, & Katz, 1998; Coyne et al., 2001; Greene &
Griffin, 1998), namely with important alterations in car-
diovascular, endocrine and immune function (Mayne,
O’leary, McCrady, Contrada, & Labouvie, 1997). Finally,
marital conflict has important social consequences not
only for those directly involved in the conflict, but
also for other family members, particularly children
(Cummings & Davies, 2002).
In order to address our research question we built an
ecological functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) task in which participants were instructed to
watch a set of emotional video vignettes of their
respective partner and was asked to elaborate on his/
her partner´s experience (other condition) or on his/her
own experience (self-condition).
Therefore, themain aim of this study is to determine the
common and specific brain pathways involved in both the
processing of the individual´s own internal states as well as
in the processing of a significant other’s internal states.
Regarding the common pathways, we predict
a significant overlap between the self and other brain
activations. This overlap should include socio-affective
areas, such as ACC, aMCC, SMA, AI, PCC, anterior thalamus,
IFG, IPL andmidbrain (Bzdok et al., 2012; Fan et al., 2011), as
well as socio- cognitive areas such as the TPJ, precuneus,
STS, temporal poles and mPFC (Bzdok et al., 2012; Schurz
et al., 2014). On the other hand, the capacity to understand
one’s internal states and to understand those of another
should not be reducible to one another. Accordingly, we
hypothesize that the self condition will also recruit brain
areas associated with sensory and interoceptive proces-
sing, such as the posterior insula, somatosensory cortex
and the SMA (Chang, Yarkoni, Khaw, & Sanfey, 2012;
Craig, 2003; Khalsa et al., 2017; Singer et al., 2004); while
the other condition should engage to a further extent brain
areas involved in mentalizing/TOM, including areas of per-
ceptual processing, such as the inferior occipital gyrus,
fusiform gyrus, superior temporal gyrus (Adolphs, 2002),
and regions responsible for self-other distinction, namely
the rTPJ and rSMG (Lamm et al., 2016; Steinbeis, 2016).
Method
Participants
Forty-two participants (N = 42) in a committed mono-
gamous romantic relationship for at least one year par-
ticipated in this study. Prior to any procedure, all
participants were screened on the telephone to assess
inclusion and exclusion criteria. The exclusion criteria
included: (1) the presence of any dementia and/or
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diagnosed neuropsychiatric and/or neurodegenerative
disorder; (2) dependency or abuse of alcohol and/or
drugs in the past year; (3) inability to attend the MRI
session (e.g., metallic implants; pregnancy); (4) age
below 20 or above 50 years.
All the participants were Caucasian, right-handed
and the age of the participants ranged from 23 to
40 years old (M = 31.17, SD = 4.748; for
men: M = 32.13, SD = 4.893, for women: M = 30.22,
SD = 4.502). Regarding the characteristics of the rela-
tionship: (1) 30,4% of the couples were married; (2)
39,1% were living together; (3) 30,4% were in dating
relationships; (4) 34.8% of the couples had children. In
the final sample the duration of the relationships ran-
ged from 1 to 15 years (M = 7.78; SD = 4.17). Before the
implementation of the study all the goals and proce-
dures were explained to the participants that provided
an informed written consent.
All the procedures were approved by the University
Institutional Review Board and complied with the prin-
ciples expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki (with the
amendment of Tokyo 1975, Venice1983, HongKong
1989, Somerset West1996, Edinburgh 2000).
Experimental task
In this task each participant watched a series of videos-
vignettes of his/her romantic partner expressing personal
emotional contents, and was asked to focus on his/her
spouse´s experience (other condition) or on his/her own
experience (self condition) while listening to the content
expressed in the video. The video-vignettes used in this task
were extracted from a previously recorded real interaction
task performed in the lab, where the couple communicated
positive and problematic topics in their relationship. In this
interaction task, participants were asked to disclose, one at
a time, things that they would either like or dislike concern-
ing their partner. The negative and positive aspects were
selected by the spouses from a list of possible topics that
was provided to them before the interaction. Participants
could choose other relevant topics to discuss. Examples of
negative topics included things that made them feel upset
or bothered, things that theywould like to change or things
they didn’t like about their partner. Examples of positive
topics included things that made them feel happy, things
they truly admire about their partner, things that they
would like to keep as it is.
This interaction was videotaped and a team of inde-
pendent coders segmented the entire videotaped inter-
action task and selected the most salient 20-second
negative and positive excerpts of the video. These
negative and positive video vignettes were then used
to construct a functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) paradigm. Neutral videos were extracted from
the (EMDB) Emotional Movie Database (Carvalho,
Leite, Galdo-Álvarez, & Gonçalves, 2012). The specifics
of this interaction task are described in further detail in
Coutinho et al. (2017) and Coutinho et al. (2018).
The task consisted of two blocks (self or other condi-
tion), where each block contained 22 trials comprising the
three different conditions: positive communications (8
trials), negative communications (8 trials) and neutral
videos (6 trials). Each trial consisted of: (1) fixation cross
(5 seconds); (2) instructions in accordance with the pre-
sent block (e.g. “In the next movie focus on how your
partner is feeling.”) (3 seconds); (3) video vignette (20 sec-
onds); (4) behavioural response (4 seconds). An example
of an emotional and a neutral trial is displayed in Figure 1.
Regarding the behavioural response, participants were
required to choose among one of three possible
responses dependent on the emotional impact of the
vignette: (1) “Bad” for any kind of discomfort, negative
state or emotion – e.g. distress, feeling rejection, incom-
prehension, abandonment; (2) “Neutral” in the absence of
any positive or negative state or emotion; or (3) “Good” for
any kind of positive state or emotion – e.g. happiness,
ease, acceptance, love, connection or comprehension.
Stimuli were displayed in a pseudo-randomized order
that remained the same across blocks. Finally, blocks were
displayed in a randomized order across participants. The
total duration of the task was 1364s (24min).
Neuroimage acquisition
Structural and functional images were acquired with
a clinical approved 3T MRI scanner (Siemens Magnetom
Tim Trio, Erlangen, German). The imaging session com-
prised one structural scan (192 sagittal slices, repetition
Figure 1. Scheme of an emotional and a neutral trial in the self condition.
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 731
time (TR) = 2000 ms; echo time (TE) = 2.33 s, flip
angle = 7°, slice thickness = 0.8mm, slice gap = 0mm,
pixel size = 0.8 × 0.8mm2, field of view (FoV) = 256mm)
and one functional blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD)
sensitive echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (39 axial
slices; repetition time (TR) = 2000 ms; echo time
(TE) = 29 ms, flip angle (FA) = 90°, matrix size = 64 × 64,
slice thickness = 3 mm, pixel size = 3 × 3mm2, field of
view (FoV) = 222 × 222 mm) were collected for each
participant. The synchronization between the paradigm
and the acquisition were guaranteed for each TR.
Data preprocessing and analysis
The preprocessing and subsequent data analyses were
performed using the Statistical Parametric Mapping soft-
ware (SPM12; Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). The
preprocessing steps comprised: (1) slice-timing correction,
(2) motion correction to correct for movement artifacts and
related susceptibility artifacts through the re-alignment to
the mean image; (3) coregistration of the anatomical
and the functional images through a rigid-body registration
of the mean functional image to the structural scan; (4)
normalization of the functional acquisition to the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard space
(Ashburner & Friston, 2000) through the sequential applica-
tion of a rigid body transformation and the nonlinear warp
resultant of previous nonlinear registration of the structural
scan to the MNI T1 template (5) regression of motion para-
meters, mean white matter (WM) and cerebrospinal fluid
(CSF) signals; (6) smoothing with a 8-mm full-width half-
maximumGaussian kernel to decrease spatial noise and (7)
high pass temporal filtered (filter width of 128s).
Final images were visually inspected to guarantee
that they had not any disproportionate head motion
and that participants had no brain lesions. One partici-
pant was excluded due to head motion higher than
2 mm in translation and 1.5° in rotation. In addition,
two participants were excluded due anatomical
abnormalities and two participants were excluded due
to difficulties understanding the content of the videos.
The fMRI paradigm analyses were performed using the
general linear model (GLM) approach.
Statistical analysis
The design of the study is based on two main effects: the
effect of condition (self or other) and the effect of the
vignette emotional valence (positive, negative and neutral).
First, to address the different neural responses to positive
and negative videos in both self and other conditions, four
different directional t-contrasts were computed. These con-
trasts included: self positive > self neutral, self negative
> self neutral, other positive > other neutral and other
negative > neutral. Next, to assess each activation profile
(e.g. activation in self condition when watching positive
stimuli) one sample t-tests were computed. A family wise
error (FWE) correction at voxel-level was adopted to correct
for multiple corrections, with results being significant cor-
rected for FWE<0.05.
In addition, the above-mentioned contrast images
were entered in repeated measures ANOVA with two
within-subjects factors: condition (self and other) and
valence (positive and negative). T-contrasts and an
F-contrast were computed to assess factors main
effects and the interaction effect. Results of the main
effect of valence were corrected for multiple compar-
isons using FWE at voxel-level and results were con-
sidered significant for FWE < 0.05. In addition, the
results of the main effect of condition and interaction
effect were thresholded at p < 0.005 and cluster size
>15 voxels. Small volume correction (SVC) with
a threshold of P ≤ 0.05 was used to correct for multiple
comparison. Regarding the SVC, the ROIs were
selected from Bzdok et al. (2012), a meta-analysis
that assesses both affective empathy and theory of
mind regions based on 247 fMRI experiments, includ-
ing a total of 1790 participants. Finally, a combination
of visual inspection and Anatomical Automatic
Labeling atlas (AAL) was used for anatomical labelling
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002)
Results
Self condition
First, we looked at the brain’s response to positive
(versus neutral) and negative (versus neutral) stimuli,
separately. In the self condition, the response to posi-
tive vignettes included brain activations in the bilateral
middle and superior temporal gyrus (STG) – including
the Helsch’s gyri, TPJ, rolandic operculum, angular
gyrus, postcentral, superior temporal poles (STP), and
left posterior insula; bilateral precentral gyrus; bilateral
SMA; left PCC and precuneus; bilateral ventral anterior
thalamus; left medial dorsal thalamus; left IFG and left
frontal inferior orbital extending to AI.
Still in the self condition, thebrain’s response tonegative
vignettes included the bilateral middle and STG – including
the Helsch’s gyri, left TPJ, rolandic operculum, STP and left
posterior insula; bilateral precentral gyrus; left SMA; left PCC
& precuneus; bilateral inferior occipital gyrus; left fusiform,
left ventral anterior thalamus and left IFG. Results are dis-
played in Figure 2 and Table 1.
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Other condition
Regarding the other condition, the neural response to posi-
tive vignettes (versus neutral) included the bilateral middle
and STG – including thehelsch’s gyri, TPJ, angular gyrus, left
SMG, posterior insula, STP and left rolandic operculum; left
precentral gyrus; left PCC and precuneus; left IFG, bilateral
middle/inferior occipital gyrus; left temporal inferior; bilat-
eral ventral anterior thalamus; left medial dorsal thalamus;
left midbrain and left frontal inferior orbital extending to AI.
Furthermore, the brain’s response to negative vign-
ettes (versus neutral) included activations in the bilateral
middle and STG – including the helsch’s gyri, TPJ, angular
gyrus, middle and right STP, postcentral, SMG and left
rolandic operculum; left precentral gyrus; left PCC & pre-
cuneus, bilateral OI, left fusiform; left inferior temporal
gyrus; left frontal inferior operulum and left frontal inferior
orbital extending to anterior insula. Results are displayed
in Figure 3 and Table 2.
Comparing self/other condition
Concerning the results of the ANOVA, the first factor
(condition) showed significant differences in brain
activity in both self > other and other > self direc-
tions. The contrast self > other evidenced significant
clusters in the activity of the bilateral STC and insula.
On the other hand, the contrast other>self revealed
several clusters, namely in the bilateral fusiform, right
middle occipital gyrus, left supramarginal/postcentral
(including insula), left inferior temporal gyrus, left
precentral gyrus, left angular gyrus, and right tem-
poral middle/TPJ. The summary of the results is dis-
played in Table 3 and Figure 4.
Regarding the second factor (valence), differences
were only significant in the contrast positive > nega-
tive video vignettes. Indeed, the brain’s response to
positive vignettes (versus negative) included brain
activations in the left postcentral gyrus (including
IPL) and right SMA. The summary of the results is
displayed in Table 4.
Finally, an interaction effect between condition (self and
other) and valence (positive and negative) was found in the
left caudate with increased functional activity in the self
condition for negative vignettes (see Table 3).
Figure 2. Activations identified in the self-condition when hearing to (a) positive (versus neutral) contents or (b) negative (versus
neutral) contents expressed by their partner.
Table 1. Regional brain activity in the self condition for positive
(> neutral) and negative (>neutral) stimuli.
Region of interest x y z Z Cluster
Positive > neutral
L Superior temporal gyrus −58 −20 2 >8 5509
R 56 −24 −2 4391
L Precentral gyrus −40 −4 48 7.22 728
R 52 −2 52 6.65 288
L Supplementary motor area −2 4 66 6.57 512
R 4 12 64
L Posterior cingulate & precuneus −10 −50 30 6.14 301
L Ventral anterior thalamus 12 −6 14 5.66 631
L Medial dorsal thalamus −2 −12 8 5.19
R Ventral anterior thalamus 10 -4 12 5.18
L Frontal inferior orbital/Insula −36 26 −2 4.78 76
L Inferior frontal gyrus −50 18 18 4.77 50
Negative > neutral
L Superior temporal gyrus −58 −20 2 >8 4764
R 56 −24 −2 4090
L Precentral gyrus −40 −4 48 7.09 725
R 52 0 52 6.91 230
R Inferior occipital gyrus 44 −80 −8 6.05 80
L −50 −76 −2 5.62
L Fusiform −42 −76 −18 5.82 254
L Ventral anterior thalamus 10 −6 12 5.89 471
L Supplementary motor area −2 4 66 5.81 389
L Posterior Cingulate & precuneus −10 −50 30 5.17 73
L Inferior frontal gyrus −48 18 20 4.66 39
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Discussion
In this study, we looked at the neural basis of self/
other processing in the context of couple interaction
during an fMRI task. In this task, each participant
watched a set of video-vignettes of a previously
recorded real interaction with his/her partner and
was asked to focus either on what he/she was feeling
(self condition) or on what his/her partner was feeling
during the video (other condition). Consistent with our
hypothesis, our results revealed a significant, although
not complete, brain activity overlap between self and
other conditions.
Both self and other conditions recruited brain regions
associated with socio-affective processing (e.g., AI, anterior
thalamus, MTG, IPL and IFG and PCC), as well as with socio-
cognitive processing (e.g., TPJ, precuneus and the STP
(Bzdok et al., 2012; Schurz et al., 2014). The fact that both
pathways of social processingwere recruited, provides sup-
port to the idea of an interaction between affective and
cognitive systems when understanding both ours and
another’s internal states (Lammet al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2009).
Furthermore, the almost complete overlap between
self and other neural activations brings support to the
idea that understanding our own internal states and
those of others requires similar psychological processes
and associated brain mechanisms. This is consistent with
Figure 3. Activations identified in the other-condition when hearing to (a) positive (versus neutral) contents or (b) negative (versus
neutral) contents expressed by their partner.
Table 3. Differences in brain activation between self and other
conditions; Voxel Threshold: p ≤ .005; Cluster Size Threshold:
k > 15.
MNI coordinates
Region of interest x Y Z Z Cluster
Self > Other
L Superior temporal gyrus −54 −10 0 4.21 355
L Insula −44 −14 2 4.08
R Superior temporal gyrus/Insula 48 −8 4 3.69 82
Other > Self
L Fusiform −26 −34 −18 3.82 61
R Middle occipital gyrus 38 −74 8 3.77 134
R Fusiform 28 −36 −16 3.55 101
L Supramarginal gyrus/Postcentral −54 −20 18 3.23 142
L Inferior temporal gyrus −44 −50 −6 3.19 102
L Precentral gyrus −46 4 18 3.14 86
L Angular gyrus −36 −62 30 3.12 53
R Temporal Middle* 50 −48 18 2.87 32
Interaction effect
L Caudate −18 −18 24 3.71 425
* Brain regions that survived small volume correction (SVC) at p > 0.05 FWE
with a 10 mm sphere using a priori independent coordinates from (Bzdok
et al., 2012)
Table 2. Regional brain activity in the other condition for
positive (vs neutral) and negative (vs neutral) stimuli.
Region of interest x y z Z Cluster
Positive> Neutral
L Superior temporal gyrus −56 −8 −4 >8 4951
R 58 −14 0 >8 3788
L Precentral gyrus −40 −4 46 6.01 116
L Posterior cingulate & precuneus −10 −52 30 5.71 231
L Inferior frontal gyrus −48 14 22 5.50 109
R Inferior occipital gyrus 44 −80 −8 5.45 15
L Inferior temporal gyrus −46 −50 −18 5.30 325
L Inferior occipital gyrus −44 −77 −10 5.12
L Ventral anterior thalamus −14 −10 16 5.18 270
L Medial dorsal thalamus −2 −12 8 4.99
L Frontal inferior orbital/Insula −36 24 −4 5.14 100
L Midbrain −4 −28 −4 5.00 16
R Ventral anterior thalamus 12 −8 14 4.71 26
Negative > neutral
L Superior temporal gyrus −56 −8 −4 >8 4440
R 58 −14 0 >8 3618
L Inferior occipital gyrus −44 −77 −10 5.35 225
L Fusiform −42 −71 −18 5.12
L Precentral gyrus −40 −4 46 5.15 37
L Inferior temporal gyrus −42 −46 −14 5.11 32
L Posterior cingulate & precuneus −10 −52 30 4.99 67
L Inferior frontal gyrus −46 14 22 4.91 42
L Frontal inferior orbital/Insula −40 −18 −15 4.72 18
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the “‘simulation’” theories of social cognition which argue
that to understand the internal states of a close other we
“simulate” them in ourselves (Adolphs, 2002; Gallese &
Goldman, 1998), engaging our own brain and body func-
tions (Lamm et al., 2016; Rutgen, Seidel, Rie Ansky, &
Lamm, 2015). Indeed, the closer the other is to oneself,
the more likely we are to base inferences about them on
knowledge about oneself (Adolphs, 2002; Gallese &
Goldman, 1998).
Regarding thedifferences between conditions,while the
self-condition was associated with higher activations in the
bilateral STG region including the posterior insula, the
other-condition was associated with higher activations in
the bilateral fusiform, right middle occipital, left SMG, left
temporal inferior, left precentral, left angular gyrus, and
right temporal middle/TPJ. As expected, the self-condition
engaged brain regions traditionally linked with interocep-
tive processing and affect sharing, such as the posterior
insula (Chang et al., 2012; Craig, 2003; Singer et al., 2004).
Previous work had reported increases in activation of the
insula and the anterior cingulate cortex for self-related
judgments when compared to other related judgments
(e.g., Qin & Northoff, 2011).
On the other hand, the other-condition recruited to
a further extent brain areas involved in emotion
recognition, such as the left inferior temporal gyrus,
the bilateral fusiform and the left occipital middle
(Adolphs, 2002; Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight, &
D’Esposito, 2008; Kawasaki et al., 2012) as well as in
the representation of another’s internal states/TOM,
like the angular gyrus and the TPJ (Bzdok et al., 2012;
Schurz et al., 2014). Importantly, the most significant
region (the only one that survived to multiple compar-
ison correction) for this contrast (other >self) was the
right TPJ, a brain area thought to have a major role in
differentiating self and other perspectives
(Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2012;
Steinbeis, 2016).
Indeed, the ability to distinguish and switch between
self and other perspectives plays a key role in social
cognitive processes (Santiesteban et al., 2012). Thus, the
higher activation of the right TPJ in the other condition
suggests that, in order to assume their partner’s per-
spective, participants had to inhibit their own perspec-
tive (Steinbeis, 2016).
Furthermore, an interaction effect between emo-
tional valence and condition was found in the caudate
nucleus. Specifically, we found a higher activation in the
left ventral caudate in the self-condition when partici-
pants were watching negative vignettes. Although the
role of the caudate nucleus for self-referential proces-
sing remains unclear, previous evidence has shown that
the left ventral caudate region is functionally connected
to the posterior insula (Di Martino et al., 2008; Huang
et al., 2017), a region known for interoceptive proces-
sing and affect sharing (Craig, 2003; Singer et al., 2004).
In line with this result, recent evidence has shown that
the functional connectivity between the posterior insula
Figure 4. Activations identified when hearing to contents expressed by their partner for (a) self-condition higher than the other
condition or (b) other-condition higher than the self-condition.
Table 4. Differences in brain activation for positive (> negative)
contents expressed by their partner; Voxel Threshold: p ≤ .001;
FWE corrected; Cluster Size Threshold: k > 15.
MNI coordinates
Region of interest x y z Z Cluster
L Postcentral gyrus −34 −24 50 6.10 182
Inferior parietal lobe −46 −24 38 5.24
R SMA 6 −14 48 4.82 45
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and the ventral caudate was significantly correlated
with affective functions (Huang et al., 2017).
Finally, regarding the valence of the video-vignettes, in
our study the neural response to positive vignettes was
more evident than the response to negative vignettes.
This increased activation was found in the right SMA and
left postcentral gyrus including the IPL. These findings are
not in line with previous data suggesting that humans
have a remarkable ability to share the distress of others,
but may react less to their joy (Perry, Hendler, & Shamay-
Tsoory, 2012). What our results seem to show is that when
interacting with a close other such as an intimate partner,
peoplemay react more to positive emotions expressed by
the other. In addition, our results showed that different
brain areas were recruited for positive and negative sti-
muli. Specifically, positive contents were associated with
higher activation in the bilateral thalamus, while negative
stimuli were associated with higher activation in the infer-
ior occipital gyrus and the fusiform gyrus – associated
with self-referential processing of sad stimuli (Reniers,
Völlm, Elliott, & Corcoran, 2014). These results are in line
with previous findings showing that depending on the
valence of the stimuli, different brain areas are recruited
(Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002).
In summary, the present results show that there is an
almost complete overlap between the neural systems
that underlie processing our own internal states and
those of a close other. In addition, the other condition
recruited additional brain regions involved in the repre-
sentation of another’s internal states, TOM and self-
other distinction. These findings provide support to
simulationist accounts of social cognition which posits
that our capacity to understand another’s mind relies
on our privileged access to our own mental states
(Lamm et al., 2016; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Rutgen
et al., 2015). This may clarify why individuals with
higher self-awareness are also more capable of under-
standing the other´s emotions. This was recently shown
by Böckler et al. (2017) that investigated the role of
a training-induced understanding of oneself for the
enhanced understanding of others. Results revealed
that the degree to which participants improved their
understanding of themselves predicted their improve-
ments in high level ToM performance.
The results of this study have clear implications not
only for couples functioning, but also for other human
dyads such as mother-infant or helping professional rela-
tionships like physician-patient. They are also important
for the understanding of clinical disorders in which the
mechanisms of self and other processing are altered, such
as depression or autism.
Future studies may build on the present results and
move further to use analytic methods such as DCM that
explicitly measure the influence that one neural system
exerts over another. DCM analysis allows us to understand
the flow of information within emotional and cognitive
networks, as well as between networks. For example, the
knowledge of the information flow between socio-
affective and socio-cognitive networks, will clarify if
these networks are hierarchically related, with the ability
to abstract mental state attributions being dependent on
the ability to simulate the other state.
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